Thursday, October 28, 2010

(H.R. 3668 S. 1745, S. 1894, Public Law 104-201 Sec. 657 (Quốc Hội Khóa 104)

S.AMDT.4451
Amends: S.1894
Sponsor: Sen Kerry, John F. [MA] (submitted 7/11/1996) (proposed 7/17/1996)
AMENDMENT PURPOSE:
To set aside $20,000,000 for payment to certain Vietnamese commandos captured and interned by North Vietnam.
TEXT OF AMENDMENT AS SUBMITTED: CR S7784
STATUS:
 
7/17/1996:
Proposed by Senator Inouye for Senator Kerry.
7/17/1996:
Amendment SP 4451 agreed to in Senate by Voice Vote.
COSPONSORS(1):
Sen McCain, John [AZ] - 7/11/1996
KERRY (AND MCCAIN) AMENDMENT NO. 4451 (Senate - July 11, 1996)
 
[Page: S7784](Ordered to lie on the table.)
 
Mr. KERRY (for himself and Mr. McCain) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by them to the bill, S. 1894, supra; as follows:
On page 88, between lines 7 and 8, insert the following:
Sec. 8099. Of the total amount appropriated under title II, $20,000,000 shall be available subject to authorization, until expended, for payments to Vietnamese commandos captured and incarcerated by North Vietnam after having entered the Democratic Republic of Vietnam pursuant to operations under a Vietnam era operation plan known as `OPLAN 34A', or its predecessor, and to Vietnamese operatives captured and incarcerated by North Vietnamese forces while participating in operations in Laos or along the Lao-Vietnamese border pursuant to `OPLAN 35', who died in captivity or who remained in captivity after 1973, and who have not received payment from the United States for the period spent in captivity.

 
CUỘC ĐẤU TRANH CỦA VIETNAMESE COMMANDOS
 
Ngày 27 - 1 - 1973, khi ký kết Hiệp Ðịnh Paris về Việt Nam, những nhà lãnh đạo của Hoa Kỳ và Việt Nam Cộng Hòa không phải không biết đến những người Biệt Kích Cảm Tử Việt Nam còn đang nằm lại trong những trại tù hiểm độc của Bắc Việt. Những bằng chứng Lịch Sử trong giai đoạn đó ngày nay được giải mật đã chứng minh rõ sự cố tình bỏ rơi hay nói đúng hơn là thủ tiêu toàn bộ một lực lượng tinh nhuệ được đào tạo để diệt Cộng ngay trong lòng Cộng Sản. Hành động sát nhân của những kẻ cầm quyền của tất cả các phe trong giai đoạn đó đã đã làm lộ rõ bản chất của bọn cầm quyền ở bất cứ chế độ nào cũng đểu cáng như nhau và những chữ Tự Do, Dân Chủ,Nhân Quyền, Công Bằng và Bác Ái thật ra chỉ là những chiêu bài hoa mỹ để che đậy những mưu đồ dơ bẩn. Muốn có một xã hội thật sự Công Bằng, Bác Ái chỉ có một cách là Con Người phải vùng lên đấu tranh thật cương quyết, có mưu lược và táo bạo không để bọn cầm quyền lấn át nền Dân Chủ, chà đạp Nhân Quyền đẩy họ vào thế buộc phải giải quyết thỏa đáng những vấn đề của Sự Thật, của Lịch Sử.
Với chủ trrương này, những người biệt kích sau khi ra khỏi nhà tù đặt chân đến Hoa Kỳ đều tập hợp để đòi lại món nợ cũ. Ngày 21 tháng tư năm 1995, Vietnamese Commandos chính thức đệ đơn kiện chính phủ Hoa Kỳ, đồng thời tạo áp lực bằng việc các thành viên khắp nơi thay phiên nhau xuất hiện trên truyền hình, báo chí Hoa Kỳ. Sau mấy lần ra tòa vị chánh án cho chuyển qua Quốc Hội để làm ra luật mới nhằm giải quyết món nợ không bao giờ trả được của chính phủ Hoa Kỳ. Vụ kiện “class action” của 281 Vietnamese Commands vẫn duy trì s tranh tụng cho đến khi thắng lợi.
 
trích AUGUST 1997 THE ARMY LAWYER • DA-PAM 27-50-297 15:
 
“Recent Lost Commandos Litigation and Legislation
On 24 April 1995, Au Dong Quy and 280 others filed suit in the United States Court of Federal Claims alleging that each plaintiff was an OPLAN 34A commando, or represented the estate of an OPLAN 34A commando, and had a contract with the United States during the Vietnam War providing for monthly wages and other benefits. They also alleged that their contract promised, upon capture, continued payment of the monthly wage. The government filed a motion to dismiss in February 1996, asserting among other things: lack of privity, lack of jurisdiction under Totten, and expiration of the statute of limitations.The case generated significant national media attention, culminating in a segment on the television news program 60 Minutes. Congressional interest in the Lost Commandos’ story was also increasing, and on 19 June 1996, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence met to hear testimony on the issue.
As a result, the Court of Federal Claims stayed the litigation, pending possible resolution of the Commandos’ issues by legislative means. (Kết quả là, Tòa án Liên bang tuyên bố duy trì s vụ kiện tụng, chờ giải quyết các vấn đề của Commandos bằng phương tiện lập pháp) Subsequently, Congress passed into law a provision for compensation of all persons who were captured or incarcerated by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as a result of the participation by that person in operations conducted under OPLAN 34A or its predecessor. As a result, the Court of Federal Claims stayed the litigation, pending possible resolution of the Commandos’ issues by legislative means.
.
The Need to Contract for Secret Services
In recent history, the United States has conducted numerous unconventional warfare operations, many of which were similar to OPLAN 34A. For example, in his testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Major General (Retired) John K. Singlaub stated that the United States conducted such unconventional warfare operations during the Korean War. He stated that there were probably hundreds of Koreans who were in a situation similar to the OPLAN 34A Commandos.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the importance of secrecy in intelligence gathering.In CIA v. Sims, for example, the CIA entered into research contracts, often through intermediaries, with numerous universities, research foundations, and similar institutions. Some of the agreements contained an explicit promise of confidentiality so that the identities of the researchers would not be disclosed.The Court commented on the importance of agreements for secrecy, stating “[t]he Government has a compelling interest in protecting both the secrecy of information important to our national security and the appearance of confidentiality so essential to the effective operation of our foreign intelligence service.”
 
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1065-66 (citing Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)).
61. Complaint ¶¶ 1-2, Au Duong Quy, et al./ Lost Army Commandos v. United States, No. 95-309C (Fed. Cl. filed Apr. 24, 1995).
62. Id. at ¶ 7.
63. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Au Duong Quy, et al./ Lost Army Commandos v. United States, No. 95-309C (Fed. Cl. Feb. 2, 1996).
64. 60 Minutes: Lost Commandos (CBS television broadcast, May 5, 1996).
65. Vietnamese Commandos: Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996). Subsequent to the hearings, Section 649 (subsequently
re-numbered 657) of the DOD Authorization Act was introduced before the Senate. See Comments Before the Senate Concerning Amendment 4055 to the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-201, reprinted in 142 CONG. REC. S6439-41 (daily ed. June 19, 1996). Unfortunately, some
senators sponsoring the bill disregarded Major General Singlaub’s testimony and incorrectly reached the conclusion that “the United States apparently contracted with
South Vietnamese nationals to conduct covert military operations in North Vietnam.” Statement of Senator John S. McCain, id. at S6440.
66. Order, Au Duong Quy, et al./ Lost Army Commandos v. United States, No. 95-309C (Fed. Cl. July 2, 1996) (order staying litigation).
67. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-201, § 657(a)(1), 110 Stat. 2422, 2584 (1996).
68. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 100-25, DOCTRINE FOR ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 2-5 through 2-6, 3-4 through 3-6, 3-8 through 3-9 (12 Dec.
1991) [hereinafter FM 100-25].
69. Singlaub Statement, supra note 35, at 61.
70. Id.
71. See CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (1985), (discussed infra); Baldridge v. Shapiro, 455 U.S. 345, 361 (1982); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981).
72. 471 U.S. at 161.





(H.R. 3668 S. 1745, S. 1894, Public Law 104-201 Sec. 657 (Quốc Hội Khóa 104)
104th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 3668
To require the Secretary of Defense to provide back pay to the Vietnamese commandos who were employed by the United States during the Vietnam conflict to conduct covert operations in North Vietnam so as to compensate the commandos for the years in which they were imprisoned and persecuted in Vietnam.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
June 18, 1996
Mr. DORNAN introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on National Security
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A BILL
To require the Secretary of Defense to provide back pay to the Vietnamese commandos who were employed by the United States during the Vietnam conflict to conduct covert operations in North Vietnam so as to compensate the commandos for the years in which they were imprisoned and persecuted in Vietnam.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. PROVISION OF BACK PAY TO VIETNAMESE COMMANDOS.
(a) DEFINITION- In this section, the term `Vietnamese commando' means a Vietnamese national who was employed by the United States during the Vietnam conflict to conduct covert operations to infiltrate North Vietnam and who was captured and imprisoned by the North Vietnamese during the course of such operations.
(b) PAYMENT OF BACK PAY- From funds available to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary shall pay to each Vietnamese commando living in the United States who submits a timely claim under subsection (c) an amount of back pay equal to the product of the following:
(1) $2,000, which corresponds to the annual salary accepted by Vietnamese commandos during the Vietnam conflict; and
(2) The number of years in which the Vietnamese commando was imprisoned by the North Vietnamese and the number of years after such imprisonment in which the Vietnamese commando was subject to persecution in Vietnam as a result of service as a Vietnamese commando, as determined by the Secretary.
(c) SUBMISSION OF CLAIMS- To receive back pay under this section, a Vietnamese commando shall submit an application to the Secretary, in such form and containing such information as the Secretary considers appropriate, before the end of the two-year period beginning on the date on which the Vietnamese commando receives notice under subsection (d) of the availability of compensation.
(d) NOTIFICATION OF VIETNAMESE COMMANDOS- As soon as possible after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall endeavor to notify each Vietnamese commando living in the United States on that date of the availability of back pay under this section. The Secretary shall provide notice to other Vietnamese commandos as soon as possible after they resettle in the United States.
(e) EFFECT OF PAYMENT- The payment of back pay to a Vietnamese commando under this section shall be in full satisfaction of any claim of the Vietnamese commando against the United States arising out of the service of the person as a Vietnamese commando.
Phần của bà Loretta Sanchez :
Bà Loretta Sanchez đã làm những việc đầu tiên đúng như bà ta nói thể hiện cụ thể theo các văn kiện sau đây:
LET US BRING JUSTICE TO THE COMMANDOS  (1)
(House of Representatives - April 16, 1997)
[Page: H1548]  GPO's PDF(Ms. SANCHEZ asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend her remarks.)
Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to call attention to an injustice suffered by over 300 men of the Vietnam war, an injustice that spans three decades.
During the war, the United States Government trained a number of South Vietnamese commandos to infiltrate North Vietnam Communist operations. Many of these commandos were captured and brutally tortured during their years of imprisonment and sustained long-term injuries.
There are about 300 commandos currently living throughout the United States. It is now time for our Nation to recognize their heroic war efforts and compensate the few surviving commandos and their families.
The Pentagon has failed to carry out the unanimous will of the 104th Congress to pay these brave men an average of $40,000 each for their time in captivity. In fact, while the Pentagon has delayed, three of the commandos have perished.
The House Committee on Appropriations has the opportunity to fully recognize their service on behalf of the United States as they consider the supplemental appropriations bill this week. It is the least we can do to recognize their enormous sacrifice.
Let us not turn our backs on the commandos .
SUPPORT THE COMMANDO FUNDING (2)
(House of Representatives - June 04, 1997)
[Page: H3279](Ms. SANCHEZ asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend her remarks.)
Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to illustrate the grave implications which resulted from the untimely failure of Congress to approve the supplemental appropriations bill.
Included in the supplemental is $20 million in payments to former South Vietnamese commandos who were trained by and worked for the U.S. Government during the Vietnam war. The Pentagon failed to carry out the will of the 104th Congress to compensate these brave men for their service to this Nation, especially for their time in captivity.
Tragically, the Pentagon delayed and four commandos perished in the last year. Now, while this body recessed and failed to pass the supplemental appropriations bill, a fifth commando has also perished.
Duong Lang Sang was captured in 1966 by the North Vietnamese Government while working for the United States. After 16 years in hard labor as a prisoner of war he was finally released in 1982. After his release he suffered many illnesses arising from his torture.
Two weeks ago, Mr. Sang passed away in Chicago as a result of those injuries. He has left behind a widow and two school-aged children. Please join me in asserting that we pass the supplemental appropriations bill so that these soldiers would not have died in vain.
END
WE MUST CARE FOR THE COMMANDOS  (3)
(House of Representatives - September 10, 1997)
[Page: H7122]  GPO's PDF(Ms. SANCHEZ asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend her remarks.)
Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Speaker, in June of this year, Congress approved legislation to finally pay a 30-year debt. The South Vietnamese Lost Army Commandos will finally have their United States Government contracts honored by the Pentagon for their years of service to the United States Army.
But accepting their long overdue pay would mean the loss of something even more important for many of the commandos , their health care benefits. The medical problems resulting from years in torture require long-term health care, care they will not be able to receive if they accept their compensation.
After years of torture by the North Vietnamese , the callousness of being declared dead by the United States Government, and years of anguish over not receiving their rightful compensation, these brave men are faced with another obstacle in their 30-year struggle. I urge my colleagues to support these men who fought and bled in Vietnam for the United States cause.
As the House goes to conference on the Labor-HHS bill, I urge my colleagues to accept the Senate position exempting the commandos' compensation from Medicaid eligibility.
105th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. RES. 316
Recognizing and honoring former South Vietnamese commandos for their heroism, sacrifice, and service during the Vietnam conflict.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (4)
November 8, 1997
Ms. SANCHEZ submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on International Relations
RESOLUTION
Recognizing and honoring former South Vietnamese commandos for their heroism, sacrifice, and service during the Vietnam conflict.
Whereas South Vietnamese commandos were recruited by the United States as part of OPLAN 34A or its predecessor or OPLAN 35 from 1961 to 1970;
Whereas these commandos conducted covert operations in North Vietnam during the Vietnam conflict;
Whereas many were captured and imprisoned by North Vietnamese forces, some for as long as 20 years;
Whereas these commandos served and fought proudly during the Vietnam conflict; and
Whereas many of these commandos lost their lives serving in operations conducted by the United States during the Vietnam conflict: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That the House of Representatives recognizes and honors these former South Vietnamese commandos for their heroism, sacrifice, and service during the Vietnam conflict.
COMMANDOS FINALLY RECEIVING JUSTICE  (5)
(House of Representatives - April 23, 1998)
[Page: H2239]  GPO's PDF(Ms. SANCHEZ asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend her remarks.)
Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Speaker, for the past year, I have been working to ensure that the United States Government honor a 30-year-old debt to former South Vietnamese Army commandos , who worked for the U.S. Government during the Vietnam War. And these individuals were recruited by the United States to cross enemy lines and fight the Communists on behalf of the Americans.
Last year, Congress unanimously approved legislation to finally pay the 30-year-old debt, and I am very happy to announce that the long wait for recognition and compensation may be finally over for the commandos .
To date, the Commando Compensation Board has processed 266 claims. One hundred forty-two commando cases have been approved, and these individuals are finally receiving their compensation.
I am pleased that the U.S. Government is finally honoring their contracts for their years of service and for their bravery in service to the United States. The least we must do is keep our word.
I look forward to the day that all of these cases are closed and every single commando receives his justice.
105th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. CON. RES. 269
Expressing the sense of the Congress regarding the heroism, sacrifice, and service of former South Vietnamese commandos in connection with United States armed forces during the Vietnam conflict.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (6)
April 30, 1998
Ms. SANCHEZ submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on National Security
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
Expressing the sense of the Congress regarding the heroism, sacrifice, and service of former South Vietnamese commandos in connection with United States armed forces during the Vietnam conflict.
Whereas South Vietnamese commandos were recruited by the United States as part of OPLAN 34A or its predecessor or OPLAN 35 from 1961 to 1970;
Whereas the commandos conducted covert operations in North Vietnam during the Vietnam conflict;
Whereas many of the commandos were captured and imprisoned by North Vietnamese forces, some for as long as 20 years;
Whereas the commandos served and fought proudly during the Vietnam conflict; and
Whereas many of the commandos lost their lives serving in operations conducted by the United States during the Vietnam conflict: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That the Congress recognizes and honors the former South Vietnamese commandos for their heroism, sacrifice, and service in connection with United States armed forces during the Vietnam conflict.
HONORING FORMER SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY COMMANDOS (7)
(House of Representatives - May 21, 1998)
[Page: H3733]  GPO's PDF(Ms. SANCHEZ asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend her remarks.)
Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Speaker, 2 weeks ago the House Committee on National Security unanimously approved my amendment to honor and recognize the former South Vietnamese army commandos who were employees of the United States Government during the Vietnam War.
Today, the Members of this House had the opportunity to properly honor those brave men by supporting the Department of Defense authorization bill for fiscal year 1999.
Last year, the President signed into law legislation that I advocated to ensure that the United States Government honor a 30-year-old bad debt and pay these men who worked for the United States Government the wages they earned but were denied during the Vietnam War.
These individuals were trained by the Pentagon to infiltrate and destabilize communist North Vietnam.
Many of these commandos were captured and tortured while in prison for 15 to 20 years, and many never made it out.
Declassified DOD documents showed that U.S. officials wrote off the commandos as dead even though they knew from various sources that many were alive in Vietnamese prisons.
The documents also show that U.S. officials lied to the soldiers' wives, paid them tiny `Death Gratuities' and washed their hands of the matter.
For example, Mr. Ha Va Son was listed as dead by our Government in 1967, although he was known to be in a communist prison in North Vietnam. Today he is very much alive and well and living in Chamblee, GA. In my hand I hold the United States Government's official declaration of his death.
Because it was a secret covert operation, the U.S. Government thought they could easily ignore the commandos , their families, friends, and their previous contacts without anyone noticing.
As the Senior Senator from Pennsylvania said in a recent hearing, `This is a genuinely incredible story of callous, inhumane, and really barbaric treatment by the United States.'
In the 104th Congress, this House approved legislation that required the Department of Defense to pay reparations to the commandos .
This bill would have provided $20 million to the commandos and their survivors, an average grant of about $40,000 per commando. It called them to be paid $2,000 a year for every year they were in prison, less than the wages they were due.
President Clinton signed this legislation into law (Public Law 104-201).
However, in April of 1997, the Department of Defense said that the statute was legislatively flawed and the Secretary could not legally make payments.
I then contacted Secretary Cohen requesting the administration's help to correct this error.
The administration responded by supporting inclusion of the funding in the Supplemental Appropriations Bill for fiscal year 1997 (Public Law 105-18)
Last year, I met at a public forum with 40 commandos from my district.
One individual shared with me his story of how he parachuted into enemy territory, was captured, convicted of treason, beaten, thrown into solitary confinement for 11 months, then moved among hard--labor camps for the next seven years.
His story is not unlike countless others. I request unanimous consent to insert into the record one story of this abuse headlined `Uncommon Betrayal' as reported by an Atlantia newspaper recently.
Today, however, I am pleased to provide this Body with this update.
To date, the Commando Compensation Board has been established at the Pentagon; 266 claims have been processed; 142 Commandos have been paid.
All this was made possible because of the commitment of this House.
After years of torture by the North Vietnamese , the callousness of being declared dead by the United States Government, and years of anguish over not receiving their rightful compensation--these brave men now deserve recognition.
The South Vietnamese Lost Army Commandos are finally a step closer to having the United States Government honor their contracts for their years of service to the United States Army.
I am proud that the members of the House had an opportunity to properly honor these brave men.
We can not bring those who perished back, but we can give these individuals the dignity and respect that's been so long overdue.
Who supports this resolution?
The State of California American Legion strongly endorses this amendment and I would like to submit the letter from the Department Commander Frank Larson into the Record.
In Commander Larson's letter dated May 1, 1998, he states, `Ms. Sanchez: I'm sure if history were unfolded for all to see it would show that the South Vietnamese commandos , who aided the United States Government in covert actions against the North Vietnamese , were responsible for saving many American lives.'
It goes on to say: `To that end, the same recognition due our soldiers, sailors, marines and airman involved in the Vietnamese Conflict should be afforded to the former South Vietnamese commandos , who so gallantly served and endured.'
It is also supported by: The Air Commando Organization; The Special Forces Organization.
American veterans who fought side by side with the Commandos , come to their defense in letters of support.
I would like to share with you what our soldiers have to say about the commandos .
This letter comes from a special forces NCO:
Dear Sir: I had the opportunity to work with these men in which they not only risked their lives, but continually put themselves in harms way. * * * We are aware of terrible trials and conditions these men endured for so long and we would like to help * * *'
I would also like to take this opportunity to mention that last year, during POW/MIA recognition day, I had the opportunity to meet with several members of my veteran community.
I had the opportunity to speak with former POWs and family members whose loved ones were taken as prisoners or declared missing in action. Several of the veterans mentioned their support for the Commandos and urged that the Government honor its word.
Today, we gave these commandos what they really wanted, the distinction of honoring their service in the Vietnam War. And on behalf of the 40 commandos residing in the 46th Congressional District of California, I would like to thank the Members of this body for their commitment to honor and to recognize the former South Vietnamese army commandos .
Mr. Speaker, I submit for the Record a series of documents relating to these former South Vietnamese commandos .
[Page: H3734]  GPO's PDF
Uncommon Betrayal
ABANDONED BY THE UNITED STATES, FORMER SOUTH VIETNAMESE COMMANDOS RISE FROM THE DEAD
On a moonlit night in May 1965, a large transport plane was flying low through the skies of northwestern North Vietnam on its way toward the town of Son La. Sitting nervously in the back of the plane was Team Horse, a group of five South Vietnamese commandos who were part of a covert CIA/Department of Defense (DOD) plan known as Operation Plan 34-Alpha (Oplan-34A). Team Horse was being parachuted in to reinforce the eight members of Team Easy, who had been deployed there in August 1963.
After making a first pass by the drop zone to release crates of supplies and a homing beacon, the plane circled around again and Team Horse parachuted out the back. Soon after hitting the ground the commandos knew their mission was a total bust. Soldiers from North Vietnam's Ministry of Public Security were waiting for them with rifles in hand. Even worse, Team Easy had been captured long ago, and the North Vietnamese had used that team's radio equipment to lure in Team Horse
The five commandos were tried and convicted of treason, and sent to prison. Only one, team leader Quach Nhung, would survive incarceration. After more than 20 years of hard labor in a Vietnamese prison, Nhung was released and immigrated to the United States in 1994. He is one of about 30 former South Vietnamese commandos involved in Oplan-34A who now live in the Atlanta metro area.
Recently declassified documents have revealed Oplan-34A to be one of the most tragic and disturbing aspects of the Vietnam War. `When you read those documents, you want to cry,' says Sedgwick Tourison, who used many of the papers to write Secret Army, Secret War--Washington's Tragic Spy Operation in North Vietnam. `It's disgusting. We sold [those commandos ] down the river and walked away, and we did it with such clean hands. And as I put in the book, nobody thought this would ever surface.'
Even Sen. Arlen Specter (R-Pa.), chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, was shocked by the abuses. In a recent hearing on Capitol Hill, Specter said, `This is a genuinely incredible story of callous, inhumane, and really barbaric treatment by the United States.'
A DOOMED OPERATION
From 1961 through the end of the decade, approximately 500 commandos separated into 52 small teams were sent into North Vietnam. Trained and funded first by the CIA, the operation was taken over by the DOD in 1964. At first, the teams were designed to gather intelligence, but their duties were later augmented to include psychological warfare and sabotage. Nearly of the commandos were either killed or captured almost immediately by the North Vietnamese , who had heavily infiltrated the operation with moles on the South Vietnamese side.
The entire operation was a failure, and documents now show that the CIA and the DOD knew that it was. Still, they continued to send commandos to their almost certain doom.
The United States' betrayal of the South Vietnamese commandos did not end there.
Once they had been captured, their families were notified not that they were prisoners of war or missing in action, but that they were dead. `The Defense Department compounded that tragedy by simply writing off the lost commandos ,' Sen. John Kerry (D-Mass.) said during the recent Senate hearing. `Drawing a line through their names as dead apparently in order to avoid paying monthly salaries [to the families].'
Says Tourison, who is the former Chief of Analysis in the Defense Intelligence Agency's office of POW/MIA affairs. `It was money more than anything else. The bottom line was that we did not want to pay them any more. We were recruiting new guys and telling them that if anything happens we'll take care of you, and we never had any intention of doing that. And because of the moles the North Vietnamese had on the inside, they knew what we had done. And once they found out, that sent a message to Hanoi that we viewed the lives of those who serve for us as of no consequence.'
But the betrayal of the South Vietnamese commandos still did not end there.
Even though the United States knew many of them were in prison, nothing was ever done to get them out. As Kerry, himself a Vietnam War veteran, said at the hearing, `After sending these brave men, on what by anyone's judgment were next to suicide missions, and after cutting off their pay, we then committed the most egregious error of all: We made no effort to obtain their release along with American POWs during the peace negotiations in Paris [in 1973]. As a result, many of these brave men who fought alongside us for the same cause spent years in prison, more than 20 years in some cases.'
The U.S. government is now trying to make up for its treatment of the commandos . On June 19, the Senate unanimously passed a bill that will pay the former commandos or their survivors $40,000 each, which basically amounts to an average of $2,000 back pay per year for an average of 20 years spent in prison.
Even though the commandos need the money and say they are looking forward to it, money cannot erase the past. `Forty thousand dollars is nothing,' says Nhung. `No money can pay for my life.'
[Page: H3735]  GPO's PDF
COMING TO AMERICA
Recently, three of the former South Vietnamese Oplan-34A commandos now living in the Atlanta area sit down to talk about their life during wartime and what moving to America has meant for them.
The site is the living room of a cramped apartment in an ersatz Colonial complex on a predominantly Asian stretch of Buford Highway just across the street from the Little Saigon strip mall. A group of happy, boisterous kids play on the landing. A strong odor of simmering soup rolls in from the kitchen.
Sitting around the table are Nhung, 52; Team Greco deputy commander Quash Rang, 58; and Team Pegasus leader Than Van Kinh, 67. Acting as interpreter is Ha Van Son, who had been part of a similar operation, Oplan-35. Son was imprisoned for 19 years and was also declared dead to his family by the United States. Members of his operation are also being considered for compensation in the Senate bill.
The men smoke almost constantly and emit a feeling of haggard world--weariness. They are all dressed similarly, in Oxford shirts and polyester slacks, and each has salt-and-pepper hair slicked down and parted to the side. When asked why they joined on with Oplan-34A, the answer comes quickly and not without some measure of incredulity.
`Because everybody wanted to fight against the communists,' says Son, speaking for the group `Nobody fight with any other reason.
Tourison's book is filled with wrenching stories of commandos being starved and tortured while in prison, and the experiences of these men were equally brutal. `All of us were treated very, very badly,' says Son. `All of us were shackled and put in a small cell for a long time. After that they take us to a big room where we concentrate with everybody. But they give us only a little of rice a day. Sometime no rice, but yellow corn. But the corn that's used for animals, not for man.'
Even today, many of the commandos still suffer physically from their time spent in North Vietnamese prisons. `When we got tortured, everybody has a problem in their body,' comments Son. `Like Than Van Kinh, all his teeth was broken out.' With that cue, Kinh opens his mouth wide and taps his dentures with a finger. `And my leg sometimes is paralyzed. Everybody is like that in the winter. Sometimes we get pain and hurt in the knee and in the body. You see the outside is good [i.e., they look fine from the outside], but inside sometimes from the fall to winter, if the weather changes, everybody gets pain.'
When they were released from prison, their lives improved little. Because they were branded as traitors in Vietnam, it was hard to get work. `It was very, very difficult because when we go to apply for a job in Vietnam, the Vietnamese communists check and they know that this was a spy commando,' says Son. `So that everybody has to go to work as a farmer, and some drive a three-wheeled motorcycle in Saigon.'
Tourison maintains that U.S. policy toward the commandos has ruined more than just their own lives. `In Vietnam, they are largely excluded from all legal forms of employment,' he explains. `Because of that, the children normally have to cut their education short to engage in child labor to support their parents. We have visited the sins on three generations. The older couples, their children, and their grandchildren.'
In Atlanta, some of the commandos are retired, but most are employed in various jobs. For example, Nhung works in a factory that manufacturers containers, Son is a sales and leasing consultant at an auto dealership, and Rang and his wife own a beauty salon in Duluth--aptly named American Nails.
Remarkably, the commandos harbor less anger toward the United States than one might expect. `My friend Quach Nhung say, everybody still have a little anger with the leaders who betrayed us, but we know that they are not the representatives of U.S. government right now, they are not the American people,' says Son, speaking for his comrade. `Of course, everybody get angry, but we have to talk with the American people and the American government to [let them] know about the facts of history. We think we have to fight for justice.'
Son has been informed that the commandos should receive their back pay from the United States in about 18 months. When they receive those funds, the commandos plan to pool their resources. `In Atlanta, we have about 30 commandos ,' explains Son. `[We] will establish a joint venture corporation and maybe we will do a business like a Vietnamese market and everybody will work for our company, every commando and their family. And we think that corporation may develop for the commandos' children's future and take care of the old.'
By combining the money they will get from the U.S. government, the commandos will have a substantial amount to work with. However, Son admits that when Americans learn what happened to them and how much the government is planning on compensating the commandos , many of them are appalled. `American people, they say, you are worth $4 million, not $40,000,' says Son. `That's very cheap. It's a little bit.'
LET'S SCREW THEM AGAIN
Even though life seems to be on the upswing for the commandos , there are still a few snags. Some of the commandos , including Than Van Kinh, have had problems bringing their families to this country. His wife and son have been denied entrance.
`His wife was denied with no reason,' says Son, translating Kinh's words. `We were very surprised because his wife was waiting for him from the time he was captured in North Vietnam.'
Tourison also expresses exasperation that Kinh's wife was denied immigration. `Over the last 35 years, Than Van Kinh has spent maybe five or six years with his wife out of all of his adult life,' he says. `This is a woman who worships the ground this guy walks on. They've been married since the 1950s, and these sons of bitches [in the Immigration and Naturalization Service], with a stroke of the pen say, `Well we just don't believe she's your wife.' What are you going to do at that point? That's just so damn cruel.'
There are also some 70 former still in Vietnam, some of whom have found getting less than easy.
`This is a relatively small community of people who paid a higher price than anyone who served us during the war,' says Tourison. `Unfortunately, the State Department and the INS give them absolutely no priority. What that means is that when they submit papers to the embassy in Bangkok applying to depart Vietnam or they get a request for more documents, it can take six months to a year until someone acts on it. And you know what happens?
`They die. I have gotten letters from commandos , and then six months later while they are waiting for an answer from the embassy in Bangkok, they die. It tears me apart every damn time that happens because it is so fundamentally wrong and so fundamentally counter to our own values. They were first in prison, last out, and let's screw them again.'
As the former commandos wait for their payment from the United States, as they wait for other comrades and stranded family members to join them, they say they are enjoying their lives in America but have not forgotten their homeland. `Of course we miss Vietnam,' says Son. `And everybody, except Mr. Kinh, who is too old, every commando thinks if we get a start on an organization, if we have weapons and we have [money], we want to go back to Vietnam to fight with the communists again.
`My friend Quach Nhung, he say, of course now I like it in America, it is better than in Vietnam, but because we have sacrificed for our country and for freedom, we did not like to see the Vietnamese communists take over. We want Vietnam to be a country with freedom, human rights, and democracy.'
THE AMERICAN LEGION,
Department of California,
San Francisco, CA, May 1, 1998.
Hon. Loretta Sanchez,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Representative Sanchez: Be it war, police action or a conflict, everyone who participates puts certain things at risk. Mainly, their freedom, fortune and happiness--but for a cause. It is unfortunate that the turn of events which led to the culmination of the Vietnam Conflict are recorded as they are in history. But the cost of war does not necessarily stop with the signing of a peace agreement.
There are other residual costs that should be attended to. These costs are defined as recognition of those who served as our allies--those who believed in our causes, crossed the line and committed to the United States government. I'm sure if history were unfolded for all to see it would show that the South Vietnamese commandoes, who aided the United States government in covert actions against the North Vietnamese , were responsible for saving many American lives.
To that end, the same recognition due our soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen involved in the Vietnamese Conflict should be afforded to the former South Vietnam commandoes, who so gallantly served and endured.
Sincerely,
Frank C. Larson,
Department Commander.
END

Friday, October 8, 2010

Vietnamese Commando Hearing








































 
 
  
 


Prepared by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Force Management Policy
Interim Report to Congress
Payments to Certain Persons Captured and Interned by North Vietnam
commonly referred to as the Vietnamese Commandos


I. BACKGROUND
Section 657 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104-201) requires the Secretary of Defense to report to Congress regarding the payment of claims by the Department of Defense (DoD) to certain persons captured and interned by North Vietnam. These persons are commonly referred to as the ‘Vietnamese Commandos.’ This provides an initial status report. A final report will be provided when payments have been completed.
Section 657 authorizes payments to a person who was captured and incarcerated by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as a result of participation in operations conducted under OPLAN 34A or its predecessor. It also authorizes payments to a person who served as a Vietnamese operative pursuant to OPLAN 35, was captured and incarcerated by North Vietnamese forces as a result of OPLAN 35 opera tions in Laos or along the Lao-Vietnamese border, and remained in captivity after 1973. Should the Commando no longer be living, payments are authorized to the surviving spouse, and if none, to the surviving children in equal shares.
Payments are to be in the amount of $40,000. If the claimant demonstrates that the period of confinement was greater than 20 years, the Secretary of Defense may pay an additional $2000 per year up to a maximum of $50,000. $20 million was authorized to be appropriated for payments under this section.
The Secretary of Defense prescribed regulations including procedures for submitting claims. The regulations establish guidelines regarding appropriate documentation for establishing eligibility as determined in consultation with the heads of other agencies of the Government involved in OPLAN 34A, its predecessor or OPLAN 35. By law, claims must be filed within 18 months of the effective date of the regulations and a claimant’s eligibility must be determined within 18 months after receipt of the claim.
All determinations by the Secretary are final and conclusive. The law prescribes that claimants have no right to judicial review, and such review is specifically precluded. The acceptance of payments "shall be=2 0in full satisfaction of all claims by or on behalf of that individual against the United States arising from operations under OPLAN 34A or its predecessor or OPLAN 35."
With regard to attorney fees, the law specifically states that "notwithstanding any contract, the representative of a person may not receive, for services rendered in conjunction with the claim, … more than 10 percent of a payment made under this section."
II. APPROPRIATIONS
The Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1997 did not appropriate funds for payments in accordance with Section 657 of the Authorization Act. However, Congress included appropriations for this section in a bill providing supplemental appropriations for conducting operations in Bosnia. This bill was signed into law June 25th, 1997, appropriating $20 million for payment to Vietnamese Commandos.
III. REGULATIONS
On May 15, 1997, the Department approved regulations to establish procedures for receipt of claims and payment to Vietnamese Commandos. On June 25, 1997, the Department published in the Fede ral Register a Privacy Act Notice in accordance with 5 USC 552a, allowing for Privacy Act protection of associated records. On June 30, 1997, the Department published in the Federal Register a System of Records in accordance with OMB Circular A-130, allowing for formal claims receipt.
On July 25, 1997, the regulations were formally published in the Federal Register as 32 CFR Part 270, "Compensation of Certain Former Operatives incarcerated by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam," effective May 15, 1997. These regulations prescribe in detail the membership of the Commission, henceforth called the Vietnamese Commandos Compensation Commission (VCCC), and the functions of the VCCC Support Staff. The regulations prescribe the standards and verification of eligibility of applicants, payment procedures, appeals procedures, and a complete application.
The complete regulations are at Appendix A of this report. Some key points with regard to the regulations are highlighted below:
The regulations are effective May 15, 1997. Hence, in accordance with Public Law 104-201, all claims must be submitted by November 15, 1998 (18 months after establishing associated Department regulations). The Commission has another 18 months to adjudicate claims, until May 1 5, 2000. However, the commission is adjudicating claims much faster than the 18 months allowed and expects its work to be completed by the end of 1999.
On July 1, 1997, the Secretary of the Army established the VCCC Support Staff. The staff consists of a staff director, a contract staff advisor, three military staff analysts, two Vietnamese translators, a staff investigator and an administrative assistant. The staff members have become experts on the Vietnamese Commandos and are capable of processing and investigating 60 to 70 claims per month. The VCCC Support Staff makes recommendations to the Commission, which is responsible for actually adjudicating the eligibility of each claimant.
The standards for verification of eligibility were established so that information presented to the commission indicates whether "the applicant is more likely than not to be eligible for payment." Rather than requiring personal appearances, the regulations call for a notarized application, signed affidavits and various readily available identification documents. Upon learning that notary service was unavailable or available only at great expense for applicants living in Vietnam, the rules were amended prior to final publication waiving the notary requirement "in exceptional circumstances."
While Section 657 of Public Law 104-201 established that claimants have no right to judicial review, the regulations do allow for an appeal process within DoD and establish specific appeal procedures for filing petitions for reconsideration.
Appendix A to 32 CFR Part 270 is a complete Application for Compensation for Vietnamese Commandos. The Support Staff has subsequently developed a bilingual application in both English and Vietnamese. The bilingual application is made available on request, is sent to all applicants applying directly from Vietnam and has been provided to the US Embassy in Vietnam.
IV. SUMMARY OF PROGRESS TO DATE
The VCCC Support Staff began processing claims in September 1997. The Commission reviewed the first 20 claims in November 1997 and made payments on 16 approved claims by the end of November. The Commission approved 20 more claims in December and made payments before the end of the month. The VCCC meets monthly and now adjudicates 60 to 70 claims per month. The following is the status of claims presented to the VCCC as of September 18, 1998:
Number of claims received: 880
Number of claims closed: 586
Approved: 244
Denied: 342
Average processing time: 93 days
Number of claims received from:
U.S.: 388
Vietnam: 490
Australia: 2
Total approved for payment: $9,969,500
Total paid to claimants: $3,024,000
Total held in abeyance: $6,945,500
Petitions for Reconsideration: 35
Commission denial affirmed: 35
SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT ISSUES
Ineligible Claims from Vietnam
Beginning in January 1998, the Commission began receiving a large number of claims from applicants in Vietnam who were clearly not former commandos. These applicants were mostly former Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) soldiers who were misled into believing the United States was making broad-based payments to former Vietnamese soldiers. Broadcasts over BBC radio based on incomplete information were partially responsible for this as well as an apparent "cottage industry" by which local Vietnamese, for a fee, processed applications, whether or not the applicant had any potential for qualifying. The VCCC and Support Staff have subsequently sent clarifying information in English and Vietnamese to the US Embassy in Vietnam, arranged for multiple broadcasts on Voice of America outlining qualifying criteria, and promptly provided specific disqualifying information in Vietnamese to all applicants whose claims were denied. No netheless, the Commission is now adjudicating approximately two claim denials for every claim approved.
Attorney Fees
Section 657 specifically limits attorney fees to 10% of payments made. In early 1998, the Department received a number of inquiries with regard to attorney fees. A complaint was filed with the DoD Inspector General (IG) regarding an attorney who was charging his clients fees in excess of 10%. On March 12, 1998, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy directed that payments be held in abeyance pending resolution of this question of attorneys charging claimants excessive fees in violation of law. Efforts to resolve the issue directly with the attorney involved have not been successful. On July 17, 1998, the issue was referred by the Department of Justice to the United States Court of Federal Claims for resolution.
Section 658 of the FY1999 Defense Authorization Bill provides that "notwithstanding any prior agreement (including a power of attorney) to the contrary, the actual disbursement" of a payment under this section may be made only to the person who is eligible for payment. Passage of this amendment in the Authorization Bill would provide the Department a possible alternative to waiting for complet ion of the judicial process before being able to resume payments.
Disputed Claims
When the Department published its regulations in May 1997, one attorney represented the vast majority of the commandos. A few other attorneys have since represented a handful of additional claimants. However, one attorney has presented the VCCC Support Staff with over 80 powers of attorney switching claimants to himself from the original attorney. Some of these claimants’ applications had already been investigated, adjudicated and approved for payment. The original attorney has asked the Department in writing to defer action on these applications until such time as the validity of representation can be adjudicated in court. Section 658 of the FY1999 Defense Authorization Bill provides a possible alternative to waiting for completion of the judicial process before being able to resume payments.
Lawsuits
Section 657 states that payments "under this section shall be in full satisfaction of all claims by or on behalf of that individual against the United States arising from oper ations under OPLAN 34A or its predecessor or OPLAN 35."
Nonetheless, the original lawsuit (April 1995) against the United States Government on behalf of the commandos remains open in the United States Court of Federal Claims.
In April 1998, the attorney representing commandos in the original 1995 lawsuit filed suit against a second attorney in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. This suit charges the second attorney with interference with preexisting contractual client relationships. The attorney filing the lawsuit asked the Department to defer payment on disputed applications until such time as the validity of representation can be adjudicated in court. The VCCC Support Staff has received three subpoenas in conjunction with this suit.
In June 1998, the attorney representing commandos in the original 1995 lawsuit filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court, District of Massachusetts seeking Veterans benefits for the commandos similar to those granted to members of the Armed Forces of the United States.
In August 1998, the attorney representing commandos in the original 1995 lawsuit filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, naming the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy, the Chairman of the VCCC and the United States as defendants. This lawsuit involves the attorney fee issue referred in July 1998 by the Department of Justice to the United States Court of Federal Claims for resolution